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THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REGIMES ON 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN CANADA  
AND ENGLAND 
Ofrit Liviatan* 
Abstract: This Article examines whether the global trend of codifying 
rights in entrenched bills accompanied by judicial review to broaden 
rights protection is justified. By comparing the religious freedom re-
gimes in Canada and England, this Article finds that although the Ca-
nadian constitutional transformation in the late Twentieth Century con-
tributed to strengthening religious freedom, its overall effect has not 
been broader than the protection afforded by its primordial English 
statutory model. As such, the Article challenges the ongoing legal de-
bate over judicially enforced constitutional systems of rights. Propo-
nents of such systems praise their extensive contribution to rights pro-
tection, while opponents warn against their obstructive impact on the 
separation of powers. This Article concludes that both sides of the de-
bate overstate their arguments by incorrectly presupposing the actual 
effects of a judicially enforced constitutional system of rights. 
Introduction 
 Observers have detected a trend in the late Twentieth Century of 
states opting to better protect fundamental rights by enacting authori-
tative constitutional texts that entrust courts with the power to invali-
date legislation infringing on these rights.1 This Article examines the 
trend toward constitutional adjudication of rights protection through 
a comparison of Canada and England.2 
                                                                                                                      
* Lecturer Department of Government, Harvard University. Contact at oliviatan@gov. 
harvard.edu. An earlier draft of this Article was presented at the 2007 103rd APSA Annual 
Meeting. I am thankful to Martin Edelman and David L. Weiden for their helpful comments 
during that meeting. My deepest thanks extend to Martha Minow and Ran Hirschl for their 
generosity and useful comments on earlier drafts. 
1 See generally Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism, 49 
Am. J. Comp. L. 707 (2001); Tom Campbell, Human Rights: A Culture of Controversy, 26 J. 
Law & Soc’y 6 (1999); David M. Beatty, Law and Politics, 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 131 (1996). 
2 Great Britain is composed of England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, each 
with its own legal system. England is the largest of these in both size and population. Eng-
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 Canada underwent a transformative constitutional reform in the 
early 1980s, culminating with the adoption of an entrenched bill of 
rights known as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Char-
ter).3 While the Canadian public reacted positively to the enactment 
of the Charter, a fierce debate has taken place in Canada’s academic 
circles regarding this change.4 Charter supporters embrace the possi-
bilities for judicial enforcement of rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Charter critics, on the other hand, portray its enactment as a perilous 
development, with right-leaning critics blaming the Charter for creat-
ing a power shift from parliamentary supremacy to judicial suprem-
acy, and left-leaning critics pointing to its failure to advance social jus-
tice in Canada.5 
 England is among the few remaining states without a codified con-
stitution. Sharing Canada’s desire to broaden rights protection, Eng-
land also debated whether to join the global trend and adopt an en-
trenched constitutional text.6 Committed to its fundamental principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty, famously articulated by A.V. Dicey,7 Eng-
land has thus far refrained from undertaking such a transformation. 
Nevertheless, in 1998 the English Parliament enacted the Human 
Rights Act (HRA), incorporating the 1950 European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Conven-
tion) into English law.8 Although the content of the Convention is simi-
lar to many constitutional texts around the world, it includes several 
constructions that effectively block the entrenchment of rights in Eng-
                                                                                                                      
land is also the only country in Great Britain with an established church. For these reasons, 
and because this Article is concerned with the effects of alternative religious freedom re-
gimes, the analysis that follows will focus exclusively on England. 
3 Canada Act (UK) 1982, c. 11, sched. B. 
4 Joseph F. Fletcher & Paul Howe, Canadian Attitudes Towards the Charter and the Courts 
in Comparative Perspective, 6 Choices 4, 9–10 (2000). 
5 Id. 
6 See, e.g., J.A.G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary 281–343 (5th ed. 1997). See 
generally Ian Ward, The English Constitution (2004); Reforming the Constitution 
(Peter Catterall et al. eds., 2000); Richard Clayton, Judicial Deference and “Domestic Dialogue”: 
The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention Under the Human Rights Act of 1998, 2004 Pub. L. 33; 
Anthony Bradley, Judicial Independence Under Attack, 2003 Pub. L. 397; Brigid Hadfield, To-
wards an English Constitution, 55 Current L. Prac. 189 (2002). 
7 Dicey’s famous quote: “The Principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither 
more nor less than this, namely, that Parliament . . . [had], under the English constitution, 
the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is 
recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament.” A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
39–40 (10th ed. Macmillan 1959) (1885). 
8 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (Eng.). 
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land as well as the possibility of judicial encroachment on parliamen-
tary supremacy. As such, England, under the HRA, remains committed 
to its traditional model of statutory protection of rights. 
 Because the practice of safeguarding rights and freedoms is 
among the fundamental principles of a liberal democracy, any mean-
ingful policy debate on the merit of a constitutionally entrenched le-
gal system should involve a factual assessment of the scope of protec-
tion afforded to fundamental rights. Accordingly, this Article critically 
appraises the effects of the two legal regimes—a judicially enforced 
constitutional system of rights in Canada and a statutory protection 
model in England—on the right to religious freedom, a keystone in 
Western human rights ideology that has continually remained “the 
most common form of human rights violation in the world.”9 
 The following analysis is organized in four parts. Part I lays out 
the contextual foundation for this comparative study by explaining its 
warrant in the context of the controversy over rights protection. Part 
II analyzes the developments of the Canadian legal framework with 
respect to religious freedom, including the changes caused by the en-
actment of the Charter. Part III traces the protection of religious 
freedom within the English system. Finally, Part IV compares specific 
issues concerning religious freedom that have arisen in both states 
and the effects of each model on the scope of protection afforded to 
religious freedom. 
I. Rationale for Comparing Canada and England 
 The extensive ties between Canada and England motivate a com-
parison of the two states for a number of reasons, three of which have 
particular relevance. First, England’s historic dominance in Canada 
(although never exclusive due to strong French influence in Quebec), 
generated lasting social and cultural links in addition to strong political 
and legal ties. Canada’s Confederation in 1867 was prescribed under 
English legislation, the British North America Act 1867 (B.N.A. Act),10 
                                                                                                                      
9 Norman Dorsen et al., Comprative Constitutionalism: Cases and Materials 
923 (2003). On the centrality of religious freedom in Western human rights ideology see 
Donna Gomien et al., Law and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the European Social Charter 263 (1996). 
10 The British North American Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. app. § 2, 
no. 5 (1985). In this Article, following Professor Peter W. Hogg, I will continue to use the 
Act’s historical name when discussed in a historical context. 
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ultimately preserving Canada’s status as a British colony.11 Moreover, 
despite adopting a federal system upon Confederation, Canada contin-
ued to follow the English model of parliamentary supremacy as its fed-
eral and provincial legislatures all had full legislative powers.12 Over the 
years the legal ties between Canada and England loosened, but the 
fundamental termination of these ties correlates with the adoption of 
the Charter by Canada.13 As such, a comparison between Canada and 
England highlights a particular point in time—the adoption of a judi-
cially enforced constitutional system by Canada in 1982—from which it 
is possible to measure the effects of alternative legal systems. 
 Second, the strong historical, cultural, and political ties between 
these two countries have generated a reasonable academic tendency 
to group them together in many legal studies, most notably when con-
trasted with their distant cousin, the United States.14 Nevertheless, 
Canada chose to transform its English-based model of parliamentary 
supremacy by adopting a constitutional model, limited somewhat by 
the Charter’s section 33 override (authorizing federal and provincial 
legislatures to declare legislation operative “notwithstanding” the 
Charter for a renewable period of five years).15 An argument can be 
                                                                                                                      
11 The Preamble to the B.N.A. Act proclaimed the adoption of a federal system in the 
Dominion of Canada with “a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United King-
dom.” Hogg argues that “apart from the changes needed to establish the new federation, 
the British North Americans wanted the old rules to continue in both form and substance 
exactly as before.” Peter W. Hogg, Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court, in Inter-
preting Constitutions 55–105 ( Jeffrey Goldworthy ed., 2006). This conclusion is fur-
ther supported by the fact that the B.N.A. Act did not include an amendment procedure, 
leaving the main constituent powers in British Parliamentary hands. Peter Oliver argues 
that this was “not an oversight,” but a “constitutional understanding” that “the Canadian 
constitution [was] also necessarily Imperial.” Peter C. Oliver, The Constitution of 
Independence 111 (2005). 
12 See Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 719. 
13 Oliver, supra note 11, at 2. Although Canada remained connected to the English 
monarchy, Oliver rightly argues that this does not detract from its “constitutional inde-
pendence” as a separate legal system, since Canada “can at any moment put a permanent 
end to that arrangement of its own volition.” Id. 
14 James B. Kelly, Governing with the Charter: Legislative and Judicial Activ-
ism and Framers’ Intent 263 (2005). Canada and England are often grouped together 
(along with Australia and New Zealand) under the characterization of the “commonwealth 
model of constitutionalism.” Id. See generally Gardbaum, supra note 1. 
15 See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 
§ 33(1) (“Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of 
Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof 
shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 [the 
substantive rights provisions] of this Charter.”). Sections 33(3) and (4) declare that such a 
legislative override of a Charter right is limited to five years but may be reenacted. See 
§ 33(3), (4). 
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made that the inclusion of section 33 undermines the constitutional 
status of the Charter. The framers’ intent, however, was that section 33 
would only be used in “rare instances where the legislature was in dis-
agreement with judicial interpretation regarding major matters of 
public policy,”16 and with time this extremely controversial section has 
been increasingly viewed as a dead letter.17 Canada’s departure from 
the traditional parliamentary supremacy model necessitates this com-
parison in order to assess the effects of such a choice on the legal pro-
tection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 The last motivation for comparing Canada and England hinges 
on the fact that neither state opted for the classic liberalist formula of 
separating religion and political affairs as the means to protect reli-
gious freedom.18 In England, religious independence from Catholi-
cism in the Sixteenth Century was linked to the establishment of An-
glicanism as the state’s religion. In Canada, religion played a central 
role at the time of Confederation in establishing a bicultural Anglo-
Protestant and French-Catholic nation.19 Also, while the historical ef-
fects of religion on the political arrangements of these states have 
been quite different, contemporary times are marked by a growing 
convergence in the role of religion. In the latter part of the Twentieth 
Century, both Canada and England relaxed their immigration poli-
cies, yielding increased religious diversity in these formerly Christian 
                                                                                                                      
16 David Schneiderman, Prologue, in Peter Lougheed, Why a Notwithstanding Clause?, 6 
Point of View, at iii (1998). 
17 See, e.g., W.A. Bogart, Courts and Country: The Limits of Litigation and the 
Social and Political Life of Canada 311 (1994) (“[Section] 33 has been so excorciated 
that it is ‘politically speaking . . . almost unusable.’”); Julie Debeljak, Rights Protection With-
out Judicial Supremacy: A Review of the Canadian and British Models of Bills of Rights, 26 Melb. 
U. L. Rev. 285, 322 (2002) (“The use of § 33 has gained a reluctant acceptance in Quebec 
and only once to date has it been used to directly overturn a judicial decision. Outside of 
Quebec, use of the override clause appears to be politically unacceptable.”); Gardbaum, 
supra note 1, at 726 (“[A] constitutional convention appears to have arisen . . . that the 
override provision should not be used at all.”); Howard Leeson, Section 33, The Notwith-
standing Clause: A Paper Tiger?, 6 Choices 3, 20 (2000) (arguing that although § 33 is avail-
able in theory, “the less it is used, the less likely it will be used.”). 
18 See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration 1689 (Hackett 1983) (1689) 
(setting forth the idea of separating religious and state affairs in the interest of religious 
liberty). 
19 Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, Religious Freedom and Equality Concerns Under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 34 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 85, 88 (2001). Legal guarantees were 
made to ensure the continuation of this cultural distinctiveness, most notably through the 
funding of minority religious education for the Catholic and Protestant minorities in each 
of the provinces. 
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nations.20 During this period, both countries experienced sharp de-
clines in active worship within the long-established Christian 
churches21 and the emergence of new religious movements.22 These 
transformations of the religious demography in England and Canada 
gave rise to growing social discontent in both states against the origi-
nal church-state arrangements, and created the need for political and 
legal reforms (detailed in the next two sections) to overcome the 
newly emerging religious tensions.23 
 The contemporary religious demography of the two states is simi-
lar. As of 2001, approximately 74% of the Canadian population self-
identified as Christian; roughly 43% were Catholic, and 31% belonged 
to a variety of Protestant denominations. Muslims comprised 2%, while 
Jews, Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs each comprised approximately 1%. 
Roughly 17% self-identified as non-religious, and 2% either did not 
state their religion or belonged to a religion comprising less than 0.1% 
of the total population.24 According to the British Office of National 
Statistics, approximately 72% of the British population currently identi-
fies as Christian; at 29% of the total, Anglicanism is the largest denomi-
nation. Muslims comprise nearly 3% of the population, with Hindus, 
Sikhs, Jews and Buddhists each comprising 1% or less. An additional 
15% claim no religion at all.25 
                                                                                                                      
20 John Biles & Humera Ibrahim, Religion and Public Policy: Immigration, Citizenship and 
Multiculturalism—Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner?, in Paul Bramadat & David Seljak, Re-
ligion and Ethnicity in Canada 154–77 (2005). See generally Robert Winder, Bloody 
Foreigners: The Story of Immigration to Britain (2004). 
21 Sociologists differ on the explanation of this phenomenon. Proponents of the secu-
larization thesis attribute the drop in number of churchgoers to the secularization process. 
See generally Steve Bruce, Religion in Modern Britain ( John Scott ed., 1995); David 
Martin, The Religious and the Secular Studies in Secularization (1969). Opposite 
approaches include Grace Davie, who argues that the decline in churchgoers should be 
explained as “believing without belonging.” See generally Grace Davie, Religion in Mod-
ern Britain Since 1945: Believing Without Belonging (1994). Rodney Stark and 
Laurence Iannaccone advance the model that disestablishment generates increased religi-
osity. See generally Rodney Stark & Laurence Iannaccone, A Supply-Side Representation of the 
“Secularization” of Europe, 33 J. Sci. Stud. Religion 230 (1994). 
22 See generally Eileen Barker, New Religion Movements in Britain: The Context and the Mem-
bership, 30 Soc. Compass 33 (1983). 
23 John M. Bumstead, Canada’s Diverse Peoples: A Reference Sourcebook 253 
(2003); Tariq Modood, The Place of Muslims in British Secular Multiculturalism, 47 Soc. Com-
pass 41–55 (2000). 
24 Selected Religions for Canada, Provinces and Territories, http://www12.statcan.ca/ 
english/census01/products/highlight/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 8, 2008). 
25 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Inter-
national Religious Freedom Report: United Kingdom (2008), available at http://www. 
state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108478.htm. 
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 There is general agreement among Canadian scholars that the en-
actment of the Charter was a watershed point in Canadian constitu-
tional history. This consensus, however, is overshadowed by bubbling 
controversy over the extent of the Charter’s significance and its scope of 
influence within Canada’s parliamentary democracy. To clarify, there 
are primarily two interrelated debates. The first centers on the legiti-
macy of institutionalizing judicial activism through the enactment of the 
Charter. Taken together, section 52 of the Constitution Act26 and section 
24(1) of the Charter27 establish the power of judges to restrain the other 
branches of government by invalidating their actions on constitutional 
grounds. Supporters of this structural change characterize it as a fun-
damental revolution in the scope of rights protection in Canada. 
Lorraine Weinrib argues that the Charter granted legitimacy to minority 
claims that would otherwise have been blocked by majoritarian calcula-
tions, substantially transforming Canadian politics.28 
 This view, however, is widely criticized by scholars from all over 
the academic spectrum. Socially progressive academics emphasize the 
Charter’s inability to rectify social injustices in Canada; the deeply po-
litical nature of Charter adjudication processes, existing social and 
political power structures, economic inequalities, and institutional-
ized support for majoritarianism all undermine the possibility of gen-
erating any real progressive change under the Charter.29 Conservative 
critics focus on the institutional power shift from parliamentary sov-
ereignty to judicial supremacy. The power of judicial review author-
ized by the new constitutional principles, critics argue, enables an un-
elected and unaccountable group of judges to make policy and shape 
political discourse. Legislative power is weakened, thus undermining 
                                                                                                                      
26 Constitution Act, 1982, § 52 (“the Constitution of Canada is the Supreme law of 
Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the 
extent of the inconsistency, of no force of effect.”). 
27 Canada Act (UK) 1982, c. 11 sched. B, § 24(1) (“[a]nyone whose rights or freedoms, 
as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of com-
petent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in 
the circumstances.”). 
28 Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib, Canada’s Constitutional Revolution: From Legislative to Con-
stitutional State, 33 Israel L. Rev. 13, 22 (1999). Analyzing the post-Charter developments 
in the context of religious freedom, one commentator concludes that “[t]he Charter thus 
appears to have worked a significant change in the direction of Canada’s religious freedom 
jurisprudence.” David H. Moore, Comment, Religious Freedom and Doctrines of Reluctance in 
Post-Charter Canada, 1996 BYU L. Rev. 1087, 1139. 
29 See generally Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs 
(1997); Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Legalization 
of Politics in Canada (1994); Alan Hutchinson, Private Rights/Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie 
of the Charter, 38 U. Toronto L. J. 278 (1988). 
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the potential for reaching political compromises, a particularly worri-
some problem in light of Quebec’s separatist movement.30 The main 
problem with this latter rationale, however, lies in the fact that the 
expansion of judicial review in Canada was intended by the framers 
and established by a democratic process. The framers chose to substi-
tute the English model of parliamentary supremacy (limited by sec-
tion 33 of the Charter) with a constitutional model aimed at broaden-
ing the protection to fundamental rights and freedoms.31 
 The other debate within Canadian academia focuses on the Char-
ter’s overall political influence, effectively curbing the debate on judi-
cial review. Critics of the Charter’s far-reaching effects, most notably 
Charles Epp, downplay the importance of the Charter as an instrument 
of rights protection, perceiving it as insignificant without what Epp 
identifies as “a support structure for legal mobilization.”32 
 Contrasting with this view are those emphasizing the Charter’s in-
valuable contribution to the task of generating a shared political re-
sponsibility for rights protection in Canada. Among those who view the 
Charter as a positive development, two primary approaches are identi-
fiable. Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell described the Charter as 
altering the relationship between the legislative and the judicial 
branches, forcing them to relate to and reflect on each other’s deci-
sions as they formulate social values and decide on the scope of rights 
protection in Canada.33 James B. Kelly, alternatively, advances a “cabi-
net-centered approach” to rights protection. The significance of the 
Charter, Kelly argues, lies much earlier in the legislative process, 
                                                                                                                      
30 See generally Rory Leishman, Against Judicial Activism (2006); Robert Ivan Mar-
tin, The Most Dangerous Branch (2003); Christopher P. Manfredi, Judicial Power 
and the Charter: Canada and the Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism (2d ed. 
2000); F.L. Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revoltion and the Court Party 
(2000). This debate is not limited to Canadian commentators. For a recent summary of this 
global debate, see W.J. Waluchow, A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review 74–179 
(2007). 
31 This rationale has been described in Justice Lamer’s opinion in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle 
Act 1985 SCC 36; see also Kelly, supra note 14, at ch. 2. 
32 See Charles R. Epp, The Rights Revolution 181–86 (1998) (noting that this sup-
port structure includes rights-advocacy organizations, government or foundation funding 
of test cases, and the availability of sympathetic and competent lawyers). 
33 See generally; Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial (2001); Janet L. Hiebert, 
A Rational Approach to Constitutional Interpretation: Shared Legislative and Judicial Responsibili-
ties, 35 J. Can. Stud. 161 (2001); Peter W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The Charter Dialogue 
Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps The Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After 
All), 35 Osgoode Hall L. J. 75 (1997). 
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namely in transforming the way in which the cabinet and its bureauc-
racy address and transmit Charter values into their activities.34 
 English politicians and commentators have also been engaged in a 
long and lively debate as to whether the adoption of a bill of rights 
would improve the protection of rights in England.35 Reminiscent of 
the Canadian narrative, opponents of a constitutional transformation 
raised concerns that it would undermine the democratic nature of par-
liamentary supremacy, empowering and politicizing the non-elected 
judicial branch and weakening the flexibility of England’s existing po-
litical arrangements.36 Nevertheless, as a growing consensus argued that 
the common law and existing legal documents afforded insufficient 
protection to fundamental rights and freedoms,37 a number of possible 
solutions were suggested.38 Eventually, a majority emerged in favor of 
incorporating the Convention into English law, believing this to be the 
best fit for English legal and political traditions.39 In 1998 the New La-
bor government made this idea a reality when it enacted the HRA, in-
corporating most Convention provisions (subject to reservations and 
derogations made by Britain) to England. 
 The HRA made several significant changes to the English system. 
It created the first explicit statutory protection of rights and imple-
mented anti-discrimination measures that were enforceable by Eng-
lish courts.40 It also authorized courts to scrutinize whether legislation 
violated human rights standards, thereby requiring legislators to give 
                                                                                                                      
34 Kelly, supra note 14, at 16 (“The increasing frequency with which cabinet intro-
duces amendments to ensure the constitutionality of nullified statutes and attempt to de-
velop legislation that is more consistent with the Charter highlights . . . the emergence of 
coordinate constitutionalism in Canada.”). 
35 Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 732. 
36 For prominent objections to a judicially-enforced bill of rights, see generally Bruce 
F. Norton, Politics in Britain (2007); Lord McCluskey, Law, Justice and Democracy 
(1987); Cyril Adjei, Human Rights Theory and the Bill of Rights Debate, 58 Mod. L. Rev. 17 
(1995); J.A.G. Griffith, The Political Constitution, 42 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1979); Dennis Lloyd of 
Hampstead, Do We Need a Bill of Rights?, 39 Mod. L. Rev. 121 (1976). 
37 See generally Ian Harden & Norman Lewis, The Noble Life: The British Consti-
tution and the Rule of Law (1986); Nevil Johnson, In Search of the Constitution 
(1977). 
38 See generally Christopher D. Jenkins, The Institutional and Substantive Effects of the Hu-
man Rights Act in the United Kingdom, 24 Dal. L. J. 218 (2001) (providing a survey of the 
different suggestions). 
39 This idea is usually traced back to the famous 1968 pamphlet of Lord Lester of Herne 
Hill. See generally Michael Zander, A Bill of Rights? (4th ed. Sweet & Maxwell 1997); 
Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (1990); Leslie Scarman, English Law: 
The New Dimension (1974); Anthony Lester, Democracy and Human Rights (1968). 
40 K.D. Ewing, The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy, 62 Mod. L. Rev. 79, 
79 (1999) (discussing the scope of the incorporation of the HRA into English law). 
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effect to Convention rights.41 Nevertheless, these institutional reforms 
have not transformed the English system into a quasi-constitutional 
system. Parliamentary supremacy continues to define the English sys-
tem, and it is statutory, not constitutional protection, that remains the 
primary mechanism for protecting rights.42 These conclusions stem 
from the following five indicators. 
 First, the legislative process of the HRA undoubtedly signals that 
any change in rights protection in England is confined to the bounda-
ries of parliamentary supremacy. The White Paper introducing the 
HRA Bill declared that the government: 
[H]as considered very carefully whether it would be right for 
the Bill to go further, and give to courts in the United King-
dom the power to set aside an Act of Parliament which they 
believe is incompatible with the Convention rights. . . . The 
Government has reached the conclusion that courts should 
not have [such] power. . . . Members of Parliament in the 
House of Commons possess such a mandate because they are 
elected, accountable and representative. To make provision in 
the Bill for the courts to set aside Acts of Parliament would 
confer on the judiciary a general power over the decisions of 
Parliament which under our present constitutional arrange-
ments they do not possess, and would be likely on occasions to 
draw the judiciary into serious conflict with Parliament.43 
 Second, the HRA was enacted as an ordinary piece of legislation 
with an ordinary majority and its amendment does not require any 
special procedure as is common with entrenched texts. Furthering the 
conclusion that the HRA was not intended to transform the English 
system into a constitutionally entrenched system is the fact that the 
HRA was enacted in 1998, but its application was delayed until 2000, 
bestowing the Joint Committee on Human Rights with the power to 
scrutinize the conformity of legislation to the HRA rather than leav-
ing it to the judicial branch. 
                                                                                                                      
41 Human Rights Act § 3(1) (“So far as it is possible to do, primary legislation and sub-
ordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the 
Convention rights.”). 
42 Peter Edge, Religion and Law: An Introduction 65 (2006). 
43 Rights Brought Home: The Human Rights Bill, 1997, Bill [3782] (U.K.), available at 
http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/hoffice/rights.rights.htm (last vis-
ited Dec. 8, 2008). 
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 Third, although the HRA created a new rule for statutory inter-
pretation, its ability to impose constitutional constraints is highly lim-
ited. The HRA requires the English domestic courts to “take into ac-
count” the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
and the European Commission of Human Rights when “determining 
a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right.”44 
It also requires the courts to interpret English legislation “so far as it is 
possible” in a manner “compatible with the Convention rights.”45 Eng-
lish courts, however, are not bound to follow the ECHR’s jurispru-
dence, and an attempt to impose a stronger constraint on the English 
courts has been rejected.46 
 Fourth, Parliament has retained the ability to legislate in viola-
tion of fundamental rights. When there is an incompatibility between 
an English provision and a Convention right, the HRA authorizes the 
English courts to “make a declaration of that incompatibility,”47 alert-
ing the government of the inconsistencies. Despite this, such a decla-
ration does not automatically invalidate the legislation as it does in 
Canada. Instead, the government is given three options: (i) the legis-
lature can choose to ignore the declaration of incompatibility alto-
gether, leaving the incompatible legislation in force;48 (ii) the legisla-
ture can choose to repeal or amend the incompatible legislation by 
the ordinary legislative process; or (iii) a minister can take remedial 
action to correct the incompatibility.49 In any case, rectifying incom-
patibility with a Convention right remains beyond the competence of 
English courts. 
 Fifth, the scope of human rights protection under the Convention 
lends further support to the argument that a constitutional transforma-
tion has not taken place in England. The ECHR has generally afforded 
a wide margin of appreciation (deference) to domestic authorities. Its 
guiding principle has been that European states have autonomy in de-
                                                                                                                      
44 Human Rights Act, § 2. 
45 Id., § 3(1). 
46 Ewing, supra note 40, at 85; see also Mark Hill, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations 
on the Freedom of Religion or Belief in the United Kingdom, 19 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1129, 1130 
(2005); Christina M. Kitterman, The United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act of 1998: Will the 
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termining how the government will interact with religion.50 This has 
often translated to non-intervention on the part of the ECHR and, by 
extension, the perpetuation of human rights violations. Moreover, this 
policy of nonintervention has generated inconsistent European human 
rights jurisprudence, and led to an operative difficulty on the part of 
English courts in extracting clear or systematic authoritative principles 
from ECHR case law. Under these circumstances, the effectiveness of 
incorporating European standards as a vehicle to extend the scope of 
protection afforded to religious freedom in England seems fundamen-
tally lacking.51 
 In light of these indicators, it seems that England’s adoption of the 
HRA allows the state to remain loyal to its Dicean heritage as it contin-
ues to place the principal responsibility of protecting fundamental 
rights in the hands of the legislators and the executive branch.52 As 
such, it is safe to conclude that the primary contribution of the HRA is 
not to be measured as a constitutional transformation of the English 
system. A more accurate description may be that the HRA facilitated 
communication between Parliament and the courts regarding how best 
to advance the protection of rights. This can be seen in the way that 
“disagreements about their interpretation are mediated by a new rela-
tionship between courts and Parliament, both of which have an explicit 
role in pronouncing on human rights issues.”53 
 To conclude, the theoretical deliberations in Canada and England 
remain primarily confined to the debate over the institutional out-
comes and effects stemming from the legal changes in each state. This 
Article seeks to shift the focus toward a much more fundamental quest; 
namely, a factual evaluation of the success of each model in perfecting 
the protection of rights by way of comparing the Canadian constitu-
tional model to its ancestral parliamentary supremacy model. In other 
words, while most commentators assume a similar level of rights protec-
                                                                                                                      
50 See Darby v. Sweden, (1991) 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 774. 
51 See Helen Fenwick & Gavin Phillipson, Direct Action, Convention Values and the Human 
Rights Act, 32 L. Stud. 535, 553–54 (2001). See generally Roger Masterman, Taking the Stras-
bourg Jurisprudence into Account: Developing a “Municipal Law of Human Rights” Under the Hu-
man Rights Act, 54 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 907 (2005). 
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Constitutional Culture, A New Judicial Review Model, 17 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 683, 686 (2002) 
(sharing the conclusion and arguing that, following the enactment of the HRA, the British 
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the dominant protectors of human rights”); see also Campbell, supra note 1, at 6. 
53 Murray Hunt, The Human Rights Act and Legal Culture: The Judiciary and the Legal Pro-
fession, 26 J. L. & Soc’y 86, 89–90 (1999). 
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tion in either state, focusing their contentions on the institutional divi-
sion of power, the quest here is to put to the test this very assumption 
and to determine the actual progress in protecting religious freedom 
by each model—the judicially enforced Canadian constitutional system 
versus the English model it sought to replace. 
II. Religious Freedom Protection in Canada and England 
A. The Development of the Canadian Religious Freedom Regime 
 As subordinates to English Imperial rule, Canada’s Confederation 
arrangements had deep English roots. Evidence of this connection can 
be seen in Canada’s establishment of religion as an integral factor in 
public affairs54 as well as in its lack of any formal articulation of the 
right to religious freedom. The protection of religious freedom, prior 
to the Charter, was therefore a result of piecemeal and often cumber-
some English-Canadian legislation and judicial interpretation. 
 Two issues relating to the protection of religious freedom were 
notable in the early decades of the Twentieth Century: Sunday obser-
vance laws and the public actions of Jehovah’s Witnesses. On both 
matters, Canada’s highest court limited its intervention in legislation 
to federalism grounds. That is, the court did not focus on evaluating 
the alleged infringement on religious freedom. Rather, it determined 
the validity of a challenged piece of legislation by considering its con-
formity with the division of powers between federal and provincial 
governments under sections 91 and 92 of the B.N.A. Act. 
 In 1903, the Privy Council found Ontario’s Act to Prevent the 
Profanation of the Lord’s Day 1897 to be “beyond the competency of 
the Ontario Legislature.”55 The Council found that such a statute was 
part of the criminal law, which was reserved for the exclusive power of 
the federal government under section 91(27) of the B.N.A. Act. This 
rationale was followed by the Supreme Court of Canada in a series of 
subsequent cases challenging provincial and federal Lord’s Day Acts 
throughout Canada.56 
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55 Ontario (Attorney-Gen.) v. Hamilton St. Railway, [1903] 7 C.C.C 326, 326 (Can.). 
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 During the 1950s, the Duplessis government in Quebec exercised 
suppressive measures against Jehovah’s Witnesses to limit their public 
activities in the province.57 As part of this concerted effort, municipal 
bylaws were used to prosecute Jehovah’s Witnesses who distributed writ-
ten materials in the streets. When these measures came under judicial 
evaluation, the doctrine of division of powers was still the courts’ pri-
mary mechanism for reviewing the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ appeals.58 
Saumur v. the City of Quebec 59 marked the ascent of religious freedom 
discourse in the Supreme Court of Canada’s review process. The Court 
invalidated a municipal bylaw prohibiting the distribution of literature 
as applied against Jehovah’s Witnesses. Justice Rand, writing for the ma-
jority, constructed the right to religious freedom in Canada by tracing it 
back to legal sources as early as 1760.60 The Canadian legal system, ac-
cording to Justice Rand, recognized religious freedom as one of the 
“original freedoms which are . . . the necessary attributes and modes of 
self-expression of human beings and the primary conditions of their 
community life within a legal order.”61 Such freedoms are the founda-
tion of Canadian democracy, and “[d]emocracy cannot be maintained 
without its foundation.”62 
 The majority of the justices in Saumur did not join in Justice 
Rand’s rationale of invalidating the municipal legislation as an in-
fringement of the fundamental right to religious freedom. Neverthe-
less, due to a complex overlap between different parts of the nine opin-
ions, this construction of religious freedom as a possible tool to 
invalidate discriminatory legislation became part of the majority opin-
ion.63 As a result, the Saumur precedent represented a substantial ex-
pansion in the scope of protection to religious freedom in Canada, al-
beit still as part of the Court’s application of the division of power 
doctrine. 
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57 See generally Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121, 131–32 (Can.); William Kap-
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58 See Patrick Macklem, Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada, 42 U. Toronto 
Fac. L. Rev. 50, 55 (1984). 
59 See generally Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 641 (Can.). 
60 Id. at 688. 
61 Id. at 670. 
62 Id. at 672. 
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 The Saumur decision (along with several other decisions on other 
issues) led some scholars to conclude that an implied Bill of Rights 
exists in Canada; that is, fundamental rights appeared to be judicially 
enforced.64 Nevertheless, the doctrine of an implied Bill of Rights was 
deficient in its protection of religious freedom. First, it was nonsys-
tematic and depended upon the ability of an ever-changing combina-
tion of justices to reach a consensus.65 Second, the scope of the pro-
tection afforded to fundamental rights under the implied Bill of 
Rights doctrine remained limited, employed only as part of the larger 
context of the Canadian federal division of powers. 
 Between Confederation and the mid-Twentieth Century, Can-
ada’s demographic composition changed dramatically as a result of 
vast immigration, creating a need for legal reform to reflect these 
sweeping changes.66 After much controversy, the 1960 Canadian Bill 
of Rights was enacted to answer this need.67 Its provisions provided an 
English-type statutory protection of fundamental rights applicable 
only at the federal level. The Preamble proclaimed deference to par-
liamentary supremacy,68 and section 1 textually restricted the judiciary 
to protect only those rights that “have existed and shall continue to 
exist without discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, 
religion or sex.” Commentators explained the legislative choice of 
opting for statutory protection for fundamental rights instead of the 
judicially enforced constitutional model with two arguments. First, 
they pointed to a continued impasse between federal and provincial 
governments on the appropriate procedure to self-amend the B.N.A. 
Act, a power which had remained in English hands since 1867. This 
impasse effectively shelved any possibility of adopting an entrenched 
document in Canada. Second, they indicated that the lingering Eng-
                                                                                                                      
64 See generally Canadian Constitutional Law in a Modern Perspective ( J. Noel 
Lyon & Ronald G. Atkey eds., 1970); 2 Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 
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lish legacy of parliamentary supremacy left legislators wary about re-
defining the role of the courts in an entrenched Bill of Rights.69 
 Echoing these textual constraints, the Supreme Court of Canada 
afforded very limited protection to religious freedom under the Ca-
nadian Bill of Rights. In Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen,70 opera-
tors of a bowling alley open on Sundays challenged as unconstitu-
tional the federal 1906 Lord’s Day Act, which prohibited commercial 
activities and the performance of work on Sundays. Justice Ritchie, 
writing for the majority, refused to identify the Lord’s Day Act as a vio-
lation of the religious freedom of minority religions in Canada.71 
Rights, he said, can be restricted in “in an organized society . . . based 
upon considerations of decency and public order.” To allow these 
limitations on rights, Justice Ritchie employed the purpose versus ef-
fect doctrine: even if the purpose of the Lord’s Day Act is “safeguard-
ing the sanctity of the Sabbath,” its effect (regulating the official day 
of rest) is a “purely secular and financial one.”72 By refusing to invali-
date the Lord’s Day Act, Justice Ritchie essentially legitimized the 
process of translating the majority’s religious values into law at the 
expense of economic hardship to minority religious groups. 
 Because the Canadian Bill of Rights placed no limitations on pro-
vincial legislatures, the Supreme Court of Canada continued to review 
challenges to municipal legislations under the division of powers doc-
trine. In Walter v. Attorney General of Alberta,73 a group of Hutterians chal-
lenged Alberta’s Communal Property Act,74 a law that limited their abil-
ity to purchase communal land. Hoping to benefit from the Saumur 
precedent,75 the Hutterians argued that the law infringed on their abil-
ity to exercise a central tenet of their religion, the communal holding 
of land, and was therefore beyond the powers of the Province.76 
 The Supreme Court of Canada was unwilling to follow the line of 
reasoning Justice Rand established in Saumur, choosing instead to ex-
                                                                                                                      
69 See Macklem, supra note 58, at 58; Fowler, supra note 65, at 718; McWhinney, supra 
note 65, at 92. See generally Walter S. Tarnopolsky, The Canadian Bill of Rights 
(1966) (analyzing circumstances surrounding enactment of Canadian Bill of Rights). 
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71 Id. at 658. 
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ercise a highly restrained approach to rights protection.77 It found 
Alberta’s Act to be intra vires, because it regulated the control of land 
ownership, consistent with section 92(13) of the B.N.A. Act.78 The 
Court reasoned: 
While it is apparent that the legislation was promoted by the 
fact that Hutterites had acquired and were acquiring large 
areas of land in Alberta, held as communal properties, it 
does not forbid the existence of the Hutterite colonies. . . . 
The Act is not directed at Hutterite religious beliefs or wor-
ship, or at the profession of such belief. It is directed at the 
practice of holding large areas of Alberta land as communal 
property.79 
Using the distinction between “religious belief” and the “profession of 
religious belief,” the Court upheld a law enacted specifically against the 
Hutterians.80 This was a regrettable outcome in the context of rights 
protection, for it undermined the primary rationale of affording pro-
tections to minorities: safeguarding them against the exertion of power 
by a majority that often finds their practices strange and threatening.81 
 This restrictive approach to rights protection was also unhelpful 
to another minority group, the Salish Indians, who were convicted for 
hunting contrary to the British Columbia Wildlife Act of 1979 (Wild-
life Act).82 The appellants invoked religious freedom, arguing that 
they hunted a deer in order to burn its meat and offer it to the spirits 
of their ancestors, a practice which the Court held to be a historic 
fundamental religious ritual.83 Although already in force, the Charter 
was not applied in this case, as the hunting incident occurred prior to 
its proclamation. The prohibition by the Wildlife Act of killing deer, 
asserted the Court, does not affect religious freedom because the 
hunt took place “in preparation for a religious ceremony” rather than 
“as part of the ceremony.”84 The Court went on to suggest that the 
appellants could have stored deer meat obtained during the hunting 
season, consistent with the Wildlife Act, to be used at a later time.85 
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This rationale seems to undermine the purpose of protecting wildlife 
under the Wildlife Act, as it implicitly encourages the Salish to kill as 
many animals as possible during those times when hunting is allowed. 
 The narrow scope of protection afforded by the Supreme Court 
of Canada to religious freedom was characteristic of the limited pro-
tection afforded to other fundamental rights, and prompted a pro-
tracted political process for constitutional change. Prime Minister Pi-
erre Elliott Trudeau, Canada’s principal architect for constitutional 
reform, envisioned the enactment of Canada’s Charter as providing a 
double benefit: entrenching the protection of fundamental rights, 
and countering Quebec’s separatism by strengthening Canadian na-
tional unity.86 Already a visionary Minister of Justice in Pearson’s gov-
ernment, Trudeau outlined his proposed constitutional transforma-
tion in the abandonment of the English legislative model in favor of a 
constitutionally entrenched system of rights.87 The constitutional 
process, however, proved to be a complex political endeavor that was 
repeatedly jeopardized by Quebec’s separatist movement, power bar-
gaining by the provincial premiers, and a number of baffling judicial 
rulings documented elsewhere.88 The end result was a constitution 
that did not fit the single document constitutional model, as seen in 
the U.S. example. Rather, Canada’s constitution groups together his-
toric legal arrangements (Constitution Act, 1867) with the newly en-
acted Charter, reflecting the long and gradual process of Canada’s 
evolution from English rule. 
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 The Charter accords an entrenched constitutional status to reli-
gious freedom.89 It prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion90 
and prescribes the conditions that must be met in order to derogate 
from this fundamental right.91 The Charter also bestows the courts 
with the power of judicial review, authorizing them to nullify federal 
and provincial legislation conflicting with the protected rights.92 
 After the enactment of the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada 
had several opportunities to develop a constitutional test for protecting 
religious freedom. Post-Charter constitutional jurisprudence generated 
a robust definition of religious freedom and overcame many of the 
drawbacks characterizing the pre-Charter era. The Court reinvigorated 
the importance of protecting minority religions as well as non-believers 
from “the tyranny of the majority.”93 It also limited the applicability of 
the purpose/effect distinction used historically to dismiss claims of 
rights infringement only to situations in which legislation carries a valid 
purpose.94 Furthermore, the Court endorsed a “subjective understand-
ing” of freedom of religion in Charter analysis, asserting that once an 
individual demonstrates the sincerity of his or her beliefs, it is irrelevant 
that such a belief or practice may not be “required by official religious 
dogma or is in conformity with the position of religious officials.”95 Fi-
nally, under the Charter regime, the Court significantly extended the 
protection afforded to freedom of religion on a case by case basis. For 
example, confidential communications with religious advisors were 
recognized as privileged in particular circumstances and as such were 
protected from forced disclosure as evidence in criminal proceedings.96 
Also, the private sphere of influence for religious communities was rec-
ognized within the larger society when the Court upheld a private 
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Evangelical university’s teacher training program that discriminated on 
the basis of homosexual behavior.97 
 Nevertheless, this constitutional transformation has not afforded 
an absolute protection to religious freedom. Employing section 1 of the 
Charter, the Court has recognized limits to religious freedom in situa-
tions where it collided with the constitutional rights of others or with 
compelling state interests. Such a conflict has been reconciled accord-
ing to the Oakes test,98 assessing: (i) whether a legislative objective is suf-
ficiently important to permit a limitation on constitutional rights; and 
(ii) whether means chosen by the state are proportional to that legisla-
tive objective. Using this test, the Court has authorized emergency 
medical help to a child, against the wishes of the parents, who were Je-
hovah’s Witnesses.99 The Court has also used the test to allow the dis-
missal of a teacher who made anti-Semitic statements, based on his re-
ligion, to ensure an educational environment free from 
discrimination.100 
 The Supreme Court of Canada has also been hesitant to extend 
Charter protection of religious freedom claims in family-related dis-
putes. For example, in child custody battles, the Court has deferred to 
the child’s best interest, refusing to accommodate religious freedom 
claims raised by non-custodial parents.101 Similarly, the Court has up-
held a judgment for damages against a Jewish husband for his unilat-
eral breach of a divorce contract which left his wife unable to remarry 
and have children under Jewish law for an extended period of time.102 
B.The Development of the Legal Freedom Regime in England 
 The diffused structure of the Canadian Constitution pales in com-
parison to the complexity of the rights protection regime in England. 
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There is no written document declaring the constitutional sources of 
England, and rights do not enjoy an entrenched status.103 The first ex-
plicit recognition of the right to religious freedom in English law came 
with the enactment of the HRA in 1998. Until then, two sources of law 
protected religious freedom: (i) common law, which recognized reli-
gious freedom as a negative right (meaning that religion could be 
manifested in any way that was not legislatively restricted); and (ii) 
piecemeal legislation from the Sixteenth Century. This early legislation 
focused on different aspects of religious beliefs and often provided un-
even protection to the different religious groups in England. As par-
liamentary supremacy continues to be the central element of the Eng-
lish system, this legislation remains legally unhindered in principle. 
 This precarious framework of rights protection resulted in periods 
of overt discrimination against non-Anglican.104 Nevertheless, it also 
generated attempts on the part of English law makers to accommodate 
the diverse religious needs of England’s many minorities. Beginning in 
the Seventeenth Century, after Anglicanism had established religious 
supremacy, concessions were made to religious minorities which gradu-
ally allowed them to publicly exercise their faith.105 By the Twentieth 
Century, the legal and political framework that developed in England 
with regard to religion consisted of the legally established privileged 
status of the Church of England,106 along with specific legal provisions 
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enacted separately for non-Anglican Protestants, Catholics and Jews, 
facilitating limited manifestations of their faiths. 
 This system remained unchallenged during the first part of the 
Twentieth Century. By the 1960s, however, social developments within 
English society were exposing the system’s limitations. The mass im-
migration from South Asia, the Caribbean, East Africa and the Middle 
East generated blatant intercultural clashes.107 The flourishing of 
these new religious movements was met with suspicion and resent-
ment. This generated calls for stronger measures against discrimina-
tion.108 
 English law makers responded by enacting the Race Relations 
Act, 1965.109 The Race Relations Act outlawed discrimination on the 
basis of “color, race, nationality or ethnic and national origins,” but 
not religion. In retrospect, addressing these pluralistic tensions 
through the legal prism of race (as opposed to religion) resulted in 
the creation of a new form of religious inequality.110 When questions 
of discrimination came before the English courts, they afforded racial 
protection to certain religious groups, such as Sikhs111 and Jews,112 but 
withheld this protection from other religious, multi-ethnic groups 
such as Muslims,113 Rastafarians114 and Jehovah’s Witnesses,115 who 
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Comp. L. Rev. 429 (2005). 
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were seen as less socially cohesive than the former groups and there-
fore not “races” in the legal sense of the word.116 
 These developments reflected the insufficient protection of reli-
gious freedoms under existing English law, which ultimately prompt-
ed passage of the HRA.117 The HRA included the first explicit protec-
tion of religious freedom in England, drawing from Article 9 of the 
Convention.118 While the protection fell short of creating an en-
trenched right, it did include anti-discrimination measures that rec-
ognized religion as a protected characteristic.119 
 Because the HRA only came into force in 2000, it may be too early 
to provide a comprehensive assessment of its impact in protecting reli-
gious freedom in England.120 Two substantial effects, however, are al-
ready apparent. First, citing Canada’s Syndicat Northcrest precedent, the 
House of Lords set down a broad interpretation of what may be identi-
fied as a religious belief for the purpose of evaluating religious freedom 
claims under the HRA.121 Like the Supreme Court of Canada, the 
House of Lords concluded that it need not evaluate a claimant’s belief 
against any objective criteria to determine its sincerity. 
 A second observation regarding the HRA involves its apparent in-
fluence on the jurisprudence of the lower courts, prompting broad ju-
dicial protection to religious freedom on a case-by-case basis. For ex-
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ample the High Court accepted a father’s challenge to enroll his 
daughter in an oversubscribed same-sex school on religious grounds, 
asserting that “since the coming into effect of the Human Rights Act 
1998, the religious conviction of a parent is something to which due 
weight must be given in considering admission to a particular school.”122 
But the House of Lords, whose decisions are binding upon lower 
courts, has thus far proven much more reluctant to employ the HRA in 
broadening the protection afforded to religious freedoms. An example 
of this resistance may be seen in the Begum case.123 There, a public 
school had a uniform with a specific dress option designed for Muslim 
girls. Shabina Begum, a student at the school, wanted to wear a more 
traditional Muslim dress, but the school refused to allow it, arguing that 
it would generate divisiveness among the students. The House of Lords 
unanimously rejected Begum’s claim that the school was infringing on 
her religious freedom protected by Article 9 of the Convention. 
 The holding in Begum is somewhat problematic, considering the 
Lords’ choice to consult ECHR jurisprudence on employment cases 
where there was a voluntary acceptance of conditions unaccommodat-
ing to religious beliefs; education is mandatory in England and there-
fore does not fit the Lords’ analogy.124 The case, however, provides 
significant support for the conclusion that the HRA has not changed 
the division of power within the English system. While the House of 
Lords acknowledged that the HRA afforded greater scrutiny to review 
human rights claims, the Lords explicitly stated that this power has 
not shifted to “merits review,” but instead remains confined to finding 
proportionality in connection to the pursued aim.125 Moreover, the 
Lords’ decision also acknowledges that incorporating the Convention 
has not broadened the protection of rights in England.126 
 Statutory exemptions have been another well-accepted method of 
expanding the protection of religious freedom in England. Samantha 
Knights observed that these exemptions “have been ad hoc rather than 
systematic and largely confined to major world religions with greater 
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bargaining power vis-à-vis the state.”127 Recently, the protection against 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief has been reinforced 
with the enactment of the 2003 Employment Equality (Religion or Be-
lief) Regulations and the 2006 Equality Act. Together, these laws made 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief unlawful in the con-
texts of employment and the provision of goods, services, or educa-
tion.128 This enhanced protection for members of minority religions 
and nonbelievers against both direct and indirect discrimination.129 
III. Comparing the Effects of Different Legal Models on 
Religious Freedom 
 Next we compare the effects of alternative religious freedom re-
gimes—the judicially enforced Charter in Canada and the statutory 
protection of religious freedom in England—on the scope of protec-
tion that each affords to religious freedom. We do so by examining 
the legal outcomes under each constitutional framework arising from 
similar circumstances. 
A. Definitions 
 Religious freedom and its limitations have been defined differently 
in Canada and England. In Canada, section 2(a) of the Charter de-
clares a right to religious freedom without defining what this means.130 
The Supreme Court of Canada has established a generous interpreta-
tion of the right, leading to a safe assumption that Canada operates 
with an expansive definition.131 The adoption by England of Article 9 of 
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the Convention provides statutory proclamation of religious freedom, 
along with specific examples for this right.132 
 The limitations on religious freedoms are also prescribed differ-
ently in the two states. Section 1 of the Charter declares a general limi-
tation clause to all protected rights, subjecting them to “such reason-
able limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society.” In England, Article 9(2) of the Convention 
places more specific limitations on religious freedom: only the manifes-
tation of the right is qualified, not the right itself.133 Such limitations 
occur when they “are prescribed by law and public order, health or 
morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”134 
B. Sunday Closing Laws 
 In its history, Canada has adopted two primary approaches to 
Sunday closing: (i) federal and provincial legislation that prohibited 
different activities on Sundays, typically entitled “Lord’s Day” legisla-
tion; and (ii) provincial legislation enacted in the second part of the 
Twentieth Century that focused on employment standards, restricting 
commercial activity on Sundays and holidays.135 Directly following the 
enactment of the Charter, these two types of Sunday closing laws were 
challenged as inconsistent with freedom of conscience and religion, 
as they coerced religious minorities and nonbelievers to conform to 
majoritarian religious tenets. In R. v. Big M Drug Mart,136 the first post-
charter religious freedom case, the Supreme Court of Canada exam-
ined the constitutionality of the 1906 Lord’s Day Act formerly upheld 
under the Bill of Rights. Striking it down, the Court found this impo-
sition of the majority’s religious tenets inconsistent with section 2(a) 
of the Charter. 
 The following year, in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd.,137 the 
Court examined the constitutionality of Ontario’s Retail Business 
Holiday Act of 1980, a law that criminalized retail business on Sundays 
and other holidays. Distinguishing Big M, the Court found a secular 
legislative purpose for the provincial act: securing a uniform “pause” 
day for retail workers. Furthermore, the Court found the infringe-
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ment on religious freedom to be sufficiently small and justified under 
section 1 of the Charter, primarily because the Act contained an ex-
emption to smaller retailers who close on Saturdays.138 The decision 
was controversial, and public pressure throughout Canada eventually 
led to a legislative resolution that saw most of the provinces opt for 
the deregulation of commercial activity on Sunday.139 From a religious 
freedom perspective, however, Edwards Books stands as an abrupt re-
treat from the promising path shown in Big M. This retreat once again 
left religious minorities with limited protection, despite living in a 
post-Charter Canada. 
 The history of Sunday trading in England is long and multifac-
eted. Commercial activity on Sundays was banned in England as early as 
the Fifteenth Century for the purpose of preserving the Christian Sab-
bath.140 In the Nineteenth Century, the issue of Sunday closings be-
came hotly debated in relation to the possibilities of selling certain 
goods on Sunday, as well as to the importance of protecting shop-
workers. These debates resulted in the enactment of several laws141 and 
court interpretations that discussed which goods came under the dif-
ferent legislative exemptions.142 The ongoing endeavor to protect the 
Christian Sabbath, however, transformed in the 1980s to a broad coali-
tion of stores, workers associations, family organizations and Christian 
groups campaigning to “Keep Sunday Special.”143 This coalition gener-
ated a statutory compromise in the form of the Sunday Trading Act of 
1994. The new law, which remains in force today, repealed the Shops 
Act of 1950 and allowed commercial activity on Sunday. The only shops 
it continued to restrict were those with an area larger than 280 square 
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meters. Unless exempt for another reason,144 these large stores may 
open on Sunday for a maximum of six hours, between 10:00 AM and 
6:00 PM. Trading remains forbidden for large stores on Easter Sunday 
and on Sundays that coincide with Christmas Day. The Sunday Trading 
Act does include an unqualified exemption to store owners who, for 
religious reasons, close their stores on Saturday.145 
 The comparison between the two countries suggests that the 
statutory protection for religious minorities under English law was 
broader than that achieved under constitutional adjudication in Can-
ada. While the rhetoric of Big M employed the multicultural nature of 
post-Charter Canada to invalidate the Christian law, the Court later 
furnished a secular explanation for the provincial act in order to jus-
tify upholding the burden on religious freedom. England, on the 
other hand, never fully abandoned the religious motivation of its 
Sunday closing arrangement, as reflected in the Act’s title and as evi-
dent from its legislative history. At the same time, the Act afforded 
broad protection to religious minorities by including a complete reli-
gious exemption for Saturday observers. 
C. Religious Objects 
 In England, the House of Lords in the Begum decision interpreted 
the right to wear the Jilbab narrowly.146 Muslim female attire has not yet 
produced any legal proceedings in Canada, and according to Côté and 
Gunn, it has not been a point of contention for students or teachers.147 
In both countries, however, legal concerns arose with respect to the 
kirpan, a ceremonial metal dagger carried by Sikh men as a sacred 
symbol of Sikhism’s commitment to protect the weak and promote jus-
tice. 
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 In Canada the issue of carrying a kirpan arose in the school envi-
ronment in Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys.148 The 
school’s governing board, pursuant to its authority to approve safety 
measures under the Education Act, prohibited a Sikh student from car-
rying the kirpan in school, as it was considered a dangerous object. The 
Supreme Court of Canada unanimously nullified the school board’s 
decision, but disagreed on its rationale. The majority applied a consti-
tutional standard of review, finding the prohibition on carrying the 
kirpan to be a considerable violation of the student’s freedom of relig-
ion and not proportionate to the objective of school safety. As such, the 
governing board’s decision could not be upheld under section 1. The 
majority emphasized the importance of religious tolerance in Canada, 
asserting that “the absolute prohibition [of carrying a kirpan] would 
stifle the promotion of values such as multiculturalism, diversity, and 
the development of an educational culture respectful of others.”149 The 
concurring judgment applied an administrative law standard of review, 
finding the decision of the school’s governing board to be simply un-
reasonable. 
 In England, the right to carry religious weapons is exempted from 
criminal prosecution.150 In fact, this exemption is even applicable on 
school premises.151 The protection afforded to religious beliefs mani-
fested by the carrying of weapons is, therefore, far wider under English 
law than in Post-Charter Canada. In England, the religious exemption 
is neither limited to a specific religious group nor to a specific envi-
ronment. Any person with a religious obligation to carry a dangerous 
object enjoys the exemption and is free to do so in any public place. 
Druids, for example, who are religiously obliged to carry a sword, were 
covered by this exemption.152 In Canada, the Multani case only dis-
cussed the Sikh practice. There is no guarantee that courts will extend 
the same protection to other religious practices. Moreover, the Multani 
decision limits the exemption to the school’s premises, and decisions by 
lower Canadian tribunals have prohibited Sikhs from carrying kirpans 
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in courts153 and on airplanes.154 Justice Charron, writing for the major-
ity in Multani, distinguished these cases, asserting that: 
[T]he school environment is a unique one that permits rela-
tionships to develop among students and staff . . . [making] 
it possible to better control the different types of situations 
that arise in schools. . . . [E]ach environment is a special case 
with its own unique characteristics that justify a different 
level of safety, depending on the circumstances.155 
Such limitations do not exist in the English system. 
D. Religious Education 
 Education is one of the spheres where the political choices by 
Canada and England to not separate religious and state matters has 
the most potential for volatility. Education is a state’s primary vehicle 
for transmitting values, creating a sense of national identity, and facili-
tating social integration. When religion is endorsed by the state, reli-
gious values are bound to be communicated through the educational 
system, generating multicultural tensions particularly amongst the 
nonreligious and the smaller religious minorities. In Canada and Eng-
land, these tensions arose as a result of religious prayer in the public 
schools and in response to state funding of religious schools. Section 
93 of Constitution Act, 1867, grants the provinces the exclusive power 
to legislate on education. As such, provincial legislation on both reli-
gious prayer and education has generated a number of judicial chal-
lenges. Meanwhile, England is constantly trying to adjust its web of 
statutes, which currently grant Anglicanism a privileged status in the 
education system, in order to better reflect England’s current multi-
cultural reality.156 
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1. Religious Education in Public Schools 
 Public education in Canada, introduced by Christian denomina-
tions, historically included compulsory Christian education and daily 
exercises such as reading scriptures and singing hymns. Beginning in 
the 1960s, Canada experienced a slow transformation of the Chris-
tian-based education system to fit its increasingly diverse society.157 
Once the Charter was enacted, minority religious groups and nonre-
ligious people initiated judicial challenges against the enduring privi-
leged status of Christianity in the public schools.158 The issue has not 
yet reached the Supreme Court of Canada, but was successfully 
brought in the courts of appeal in Ontario and British Columbia.159 In 
Zylbererg v. Sudbury Board of Education (Director),160 the court struck 
down a regulation requiring public schools to conduct daily religious 
exercises, explaining that it was a violation of section 2(a) of the Char-
ter. The court held that the available exemption to non-Christians did 
not negate the coercive characteristic of the required exercise. 
 Similarly, in Canadian Civil Liberties Ass’n v. Ontario (Minister of 
Education),161 the court concluded that the challenged program of re-
ligious education was a form of religious indoctrination, even for 
those who could exempt themselves. Explaining its conclusion, the 
court stated: 
The right to be excused from class, or to be exempted from 
participation does not overcome the infringement of the 
Charter freedom of conscience and religion by the mandated 
religious exercises. On the contrary, the exemption provision 
imposes a penalty on pupils from religious minorities who 
utilize it by stigmatizing them as nonconformists and setting 
them apart from their fellow students who are members of the 
dominant religion. In our opinion, the conclusion is inescap-
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able that the exemption provision fails to mitigate the in-
fringement of freedom of conscience and religion.162 
 By recognizing that exemptions from religious instruction and 
prayer in public schools may not be enough to overcome discrimina-
tion, Canada went much further than England in affording protection 
to minority religious groups and the non-religious. In England, reli-
gious education is part of the core curriculum of public schools. Its 
statutory framework requires each school to create a syllabus that re-
flects Christianity as England’s main religious tradition, while taking 
into account the practices of the country’s other principal religions.163 
Each school decides separately on the content of the syllabus, based on 
the recommendation of the Local Advisory Council on Religious Edu-
cation, which is required by law to consist of Christian representatives 
and representatives from other religious denominations that “appro-
priately reflect the religious traditions in the area.”164 As such, in areas 
with a non-Christian majority, greater consideration is given to alterna-
tive religions. 
 In addition to religious education, English state-schools are re-
quired to conduct a daily act of Christian worship.165 The collective 
worship “is of broadly Christian character . . . without being distinctive 
of any particular Christian denomination.”166 Children may be ex-
cused from religious education and the daily religious worship at the 
request of their parents (subject to the approval of the school), and 
the Advisory Council has the authority to waive the requirement of 
religious worship altogether if it considers the practice inappropriate 
for some or all students. According to the 2006 Religious Freedom 
Report on the United Kingdom, published annually by the U.S. De-
partment of State,167 religious prayer in schools has been greatly criti-
cized, primarily by teacher’s organizations. 
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2. Public Funding of Religious Schools 
 Section 93 of Constitution Act, 1867, requiring Ontario and Que-
bec to fund denominational education for their respective Catholic and 
Protestant minorities, developed into a controversial arrangement as 
Canada’s population became increasingly diversified. In recent dec-
ades, all provinces except Ontario amended these legal requirements 
in order to generate greater equality among religious groups, either by 
extending financial support to the other minorities, or by abolishing 
the historic privileges of the Christian denominations.168 
 As for Ontario, Canada’s most populous province, two demo-
graphic developments since the time of Confederation are worth 
mentioning. First, the number of Catholics has increased in propor-
tion to Protestants, who have historically been the province’s largest 
religious group. Second, Ontario’s population has grown increasingly 
diverse, as previously miniscule religious groups have developed into 
substantial minorities. Accordingly, the continued public funding of 
Catholic schools, a reflection of historic Christian biases, has become 
overtly discriminatory in recent decades.169 
 Following the enactment of the Charter, the Catholic schools’ 
privileges were challenged in court. In Reference re an Act to Amend the 
Education Act (Ontario),170 also known as The Bill 30 Case, the Supreme 
Court of Canada was asked to review the constitutionality of Bill 30, 
which extended the funding of Catholic education through high 
school.171 The Court found the Bill immune from Charter review pur-
suant to section 29 of the Charter, which states that “[n]othing in this 
Charter abrogates or derogates from any rights or privileges guaran-
teed under the Constitution of Canada in respect of denominational, 
separate or dissentient schools.” Justice Wilson’s rationale was that this 
special treatment of Catholics is exempt by section 29, “even if it sits 
uncomfortably with the concept of equality embodied in the Charter,” 
because it represents “a fundamental part of the Confederation com-
promise.”172 
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 The issue was litigated again in Adler v. Ontario.173 The parents of 
children attending Jewish and other independent religious schools 
sought the extension of public funding to all minority religions in the 
province based on the Charter guarantees of religious freedom and 
equality. The Supreme Court of Canada, affirming its earlier rationale, 
refused to employ the Charter to reform the historic arrangement, 
however discriminatory it became. 
 Ontario’s discrimination in religious education was challenged 
internationally as well.174 When a complaint was filed with the U.N. 
Human Rights Committee, Canada was found to be in breach of 
“rights under Article 26 of the Covenant to Equal and Effective Pro-
tection Against Discrimination.”175 Nevertheless, Ontario has still not 
extended its funding to other religious schools, nor has it discontin-
ued its practice of funding Catholic schools. 
 In England, Anglicanism’s established status has generated a con-
tinuing challenge for minority religious groups, as well as law makers 
attempting to dilute Christianity’s privileged position. Nearly a third of 
the schools in the state-funded education system are religious 
schools.176 According to the 2006 International Religious Freedom Re-
port, out of approximately 25,000 state-funded schools there were 6874 
religious schools. Of these, 4659 were Anglican, 2053 were Roman 
Catholic, 115 represented other Christian denominations, thirty-six 
were Jewish, seven were Muslim, two were Sikh, one was Greek Ortho-
dox and one was Seventh-Day Adventist; additional Jewish, Muslim and 
Sikh schools have been tentatively approved.177 While Christian and 
Jewish schools have been well-established in England for many years, 
the approval of state funded schools for Muslims and Sikhs, who are 
newer to England, occurred only recently, after years of robust cam-
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paigning.178 Interestingly, this campaigning has not yet produced any 
legal challenges on the basis of religious discrimination. 
 The principal lessons to draw from the comparison of religious 
education are as follows. Canadian courts played a strong activist role in 
protecting the individual manifestation of religious beliefs, both in 
their decisions regarding religious objects and in the context of reli-
gious education. The Supreme Court of Canada, however, refused to 
interfere in Ontario’s funding arrangements, ultimately deferring to 
the established historical considerations. This rationale is somewhat 
odd in light of the English developments, where the elevated status of 
Anglicanism has not proven to be an obstacle to achieving greater 
equality in educational funding. One possible explanation for this dis-
crepancy is the distinction between an individual rights approach, 
broadly safeguarded by the courts, and a group rights approach, which 
has been afforded a lower level of protection.179 This explanation is 
weakened, however, by the explicit recognition in the Charter of group 
rights with respect to language. It is clear that the protection of reli-
gious minorities in Canada, bolstered by the Charter, fell short of the 
English statutory protections, as exemplified by the examples of reli-
gious objects and Ontario’s funding of religious schools. Nevertheless, 
as far as religious education is concerned, the incremental progress in 
England in reducing inequalities between religious minorities and the 
privileges of the Anglican Church has placed England almost at the 
point of pre-Charter Canada. 
E. Parental Religious Freedom Rights 
 The last issue to generate similar legal challenges in both countries 
thus far concerns the conflict between the rights of parents to educate 
their children in accordance with their religious beliefs and the states’ 
interest in supervising education. In Canada, this conflict arose when a 
pastor who was home schooling his children was convicted of truancy, 
after neglecting to obtain the required certification from the education 
authorities under the Alberta School Act. He claimed that the statutory 
requirement was a violation of his religious freedom because it would 
be a sin for him “to request the state to permit him to do God’s will.”180 
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 This case was one of the earliest to interpret section 2(a) of the 
Charter, and the Supreme Court of Canada had yet to establish its Syn-
dicat Northcrest doctrine, requiring a low threshold for a belief to come 
under a section 2(a) evaluation.181 The Court unanimously agreed that 
the claim of a limitation on religious freedom should be dismissed, but 
was again divided on the rationale. A minority of three justices recog-
nized an infringement on the father’s religious belief, only to find that 
it was justified as a compelling interest of the province to ensure ade-
quate education for children (citing section 1 as authority). The major-
ity did not find the statutory requirement for certification offensive to 
section 2(a), as it accommodates the right of parents to make educa-
tional decisions for their children, including whether or not to home 
school them. Justice Wilson resorted to the purpose-effect distinction, 
finding that the purpose of the certification requirement was to ensure 
efficient education to all, and that the effect of such a requirement on 
the appellant’s religious freedom was an “extremely formalistic and 
technical one” not rising to a violation of section 2(a).182 
 In England, the issue of parental religious freedom rights arose 
when a statutory ban on corporal punishment in schools was challenged. 
In R. (Williamson) v. Secretary of Education and Employment,183 parents of 
children in Christian independent schools sought the authorization of 
their children’s schoolteachers to administer physical punishment for 
disciplinary purposes as part of their religious belief. The House of Lords 
agreed that the statutory ban on corporal punishment in schools inter-
fered with the parents’ religious beliefs guaranteed under Article 9(1) of 
the Convention. They found this interference to be justified, however, as 
a necessary protection of the children’s well-being under Article 9(2). 
 The courts of both states have taken similar paths when demar-
cating the limitations on the right of parents to raise their children in 
the tenets of their faith. Supervising the education of the young has 
been identified in both countries as a compelling state interest pre-
vailing over the parents’ right to religious freedom. Neither the sup-
posed difference in constitutional protection between the two models 
nor the differences in the elements constructing the balancing test 
between fundamental rights and state interest in each state was mate-
rial, as both courts reached identical results. 
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Conclusion 
 Is a judicially enforced bill of rights the best instrument to pro-
tect religious freedom? A comparative analysis reveals that both sides 
of the debate on the value of an entrenched system of rights overstate 
their positions. In Canada, critics of the Charter who caution against 
judicial intervention in public policy choices can certainly support 
their arguments with cases such as Big M, Syndicat Northcrest, Zylberberg 
and Canadian Civil Liberties. At the same time, Bill 30, Adler and Ed-
wards Books severely contradict this argument, as those respective 
courts staunchly refused to substitute their own judgment for that of 
the legislature. Those who value the Charter as a vehicle for advanc-
ing rights protection in Canada are surely content with the outcome 
of Multani, but must realize that the statutory protection, which the 
Charter was supposed to transform, has proven to be much more ex-
pansive in England, as exemplified by the legislation on dangerous 
objects and the Sunday Retail Act. The English statutory protections 
that the Canadians sought to replace proved resilient.184 Nevertheless, 
deficiencies still exist within the English model, as exemplified by Be-
gum and the reality of religious education, where the HRA was not 
helpful in broadening the protection of religious freedom. 
 Advocates of an entrenched bill of rights generally raise several 
arguments to support their position.185 First, fundamental rights re-
ceive better protection under a bill of rights that clearly states and 
outlines their meanings. Second, a bill of rights charts the division of 
powers, enabling courts to impose restraints on the legislative or ex-
ecutive branches that may be more susceptible to political influences. 
Finally, a bill of rights has educational value, as it generates greater 
awareness of human rights and a culture of rights protection. 
 While the first two arguments are still open for debate, the third 
argument, as a matter of legal policy, seems to hold true for Canada: a 
bill of rights was useful in creating an institutional foundation for ad-
vancing the protection of rights in that state. On its twenty-fifth anni-
versary, we can confidently conclude that the Charter did contribute 
to a change in tone and discourse on the part of the Supreme Court 
of Canada in relations to rights protection, and facilitated the devel-
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opment of clearer tests to evaluate infringements on rights. Moreover, 
it provided Canada with a fast track to broaden the pre-Charter pro-
tection that had been sporadically afforded as part of a limited en-
forcement of rights created by the federal and provincial division of 
power. At the same time, the greatest achievements of the Canadian 
system concerning religious freedom simply brought Canada, in most 
cases, to the level of protection afforded under the English legislative 
system—one which the English themselves find insufficient.186 
 Opponents of a bill of rights focus on its obstructive effect on the 
separation of powers. The comparative findings of this Article suggest 
that it might not be realistic to attribute such revolutionary powers to 
a bill of rights, as they have proven rather limited as a paradigm for 
optimizing rights protection even in one of the world’s most progres-
sive democracies.187 These findings suggest that the focus of the de-
bate should shift from its current emphasis on institutionalism toward 
critically evaluating the role that societies bestow upon the law in their 
quest for the protection of rights. Newly emerging or struggling de-
mocracies continually seek guidance in existing Western constitutions 
to overcome their social tensions, yet those documents have produced 
only mediocre results in improving the protection of religious free-
dom. Should we conclude that the possibility of perfecting rights pro-
tection lies beyond the legal realm and focus our attention on the so-
cial and political theaters instead? Perhaps the answer can be found in 
the words of Learned Hand: 
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much 
upon constitutions, upon laws and courts. These are false 
hopes; believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the 
hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, 
no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court 
can even do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no 
constitution, no law, no court to save it.188 
                                                                                                                      
186 Barendt, supra note 48, at 32. 
187 But cf. Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of 
the New Constitutionalism (2004) (reaching a similar conclusion in comparing the 
recent constitutional transformations in Israel, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa). 
188 Learned Hand, in In the Spirit of Liberty: Paper and Addresses of Learned 
Hand 189–90 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1952). 
